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Abstract
In common–value auctions bidders have access to public information, and may also hold
private information prior to choosing their bids. The literature has predominately focused
on the case in which bidders are ex–ante symmetric and privately informed, and finds that
aggressive bidding such that payoffs are negative is common (the winner’s curse). In practice,
bidders often only have access to public information, and use this information to form (pos-
sibly differing) beliefs. In addition, a bidder who is not privately informed may face bidders
who are. We examine bidding behavior of both informed and uninformed bidders, and vary
the information structure they face. We find that uninformed bidders underbid dramatically
and persistently, while informed bidders tend to overbid in the two–bidder case. Our results
highlight the importance of correctly modeling the information available to bidders.
JEL Classifications: D44; D82; D72.
Keywords: auctions, asymmetric information structures, underbidding, public informa-
tion.
1 Introduction
An important and well studied class of auctions are those for leases of oil and gas tracts,
studied by Hendricks and Porter and co–authors (1987, 1988 and others).1 Such auctions are
typically referred to as common–value. They share the characteristic that all bidders have
access to public information regarding the value of the lease. Bidders may also hold private
information about this value prior to choosing their bids. Auctioned offshore tracts typically
fall into two categories. In the first, referred to as drainage tracts, some or all of the bidders
have access to private information regarding the value prior to bidding. Auctions of drainage
tracts include situations in which all bidders have private information, and also cases in which
some bidders have private information, while others only have public information.2 In the
second category, referred to as wildcat tracts, no bidder has access to private information
prior to bidding.
The literature on auctions has been largely concerned the case in which all bidders have
access to private signals, which might differ in their level of informativeness. We are not
aware of any experimental study of first–price auctions which has investigated bidding be-
havior when some or all of the bidders only have access to publicly available information
as is typically the case in wildcat auctions.3 Interestingly, wildcat auctions make up the
overwhelming majority (83%) of auctions in the dataset studied by Hendricks, Porter and
co–authors. This paper provides a first experimental investigation of these cases while con-
trasting it with the better studied case in which all bidders observe private signals. As such,
we investigate the central information settings faced by bidders in the Hendricks–Porter et
al. studies.
Interestingly, the data used by Hendricks, Porter and co–authors shows that the number
of bidders in both wildcat and drainage auctions was relatively small, with the overwhelming
majority of auctions attracting less than seven bidders.4 In fact, auctions with only two
bidders account for 24% of drainage auctions and 18% of wildcat auctions. If we take out
auctions that only attracted one bidder, two bidder auctions make up 41% of drainage
auctions and 29% of wildcat auctions.5 This is particularly interesting as experimental
studies of first–price, sealed–bid common–value auctions usually are conducted with four or
1Some of these papers include Hendricks et al. (1987); Hendricks and Porter (1988); Hendricks et al.
(1989, 1993, 2003).
2It has been observed that when there was more than one bidder who held private information, bidders
who only had public information tended to drop out of the auction.
3While the auctions in Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) did not provide private information to subjects,
each subject reported their estimate of the value, and this was taken as an informative signal in the analysis
4http://capcp.psu.edu/data-and-software/outer-continental-shelf-ocs-auction-data
5While auctions with only two bidders are remarkably common, it is possible that this comes about
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more bidders. In order to fill the void, we design an auction experiment with two bidders
in three different information structures. The value of the good is common, but uncertain.
We vary the number of bidders who have private information at the time they choose their
bids. Either both bidders observe signals, as is commonly studied in the literature, or only
one bidder receives such private information, while the other only has access to the common
knowledge distribution from which the value of the good is drawn. Lastly, we study auctions
where both bidders only have access to public information.
In line with other experimental studies, we find that agents with private information
tend to overbid, and are susceptible to the winner’s curse. Our main finding is that agents
who only observe public information systematically underbid, and this behavior persists over
time. When no agent has private information the magnitude of this underbidding is over-
whelming and this behavior involves not best responding by all players. The underbidding of
uninformed agents occurs both when the other bidder is privately informed and when she is
not. When all bidders have only public information, this underbidding results in the players
getting large profits. Hence, in contrast to previous experimental studies which involved
all agents obtaining private information and overbidding, we find that when no agent has
private information the winner of the auction may be thought of as “blessed.”
The primary contribution of this paper is to uncover the behavior of agents who have
only public information about their environment. We argue that the underbidding of such
agents cannot be explained by risk and loss aversion, collusion or cursed bidders. While a
model of level–k reasoning is qualitatively in line with our results, our estimates suggest that
bidders must hold implausible beliefs for this explanation to hold.
We check for the robustness of our observations by increasing the number of bidders from
two to four and to six in auctions where no bidders hold private information. We find that, on
average, underbidding persists, although the level of underbidding decreases in the number
of bidders. When there are two or four bidders, bidders earn a positive payoff. When there
are six bidders, the winning bid is aggressive enough that payoffs are negative, on average.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
predictions. Section 3 presents our experimental design, followed by Section 4 which describes
our results. Section 6 assesses the ability of alternative bidding models to explain our data.
through endogenous entry. As a result, some bidders may decide on their bids before they know the exact
number of bidders. These issues have previously been studied in the experimental literature. For example,
Cox et al. (2001) study entry in common–value auctions in environments where the number of bidders is
revealed before bids are placed. De Silva et al. (2009) study entry in both common and private value auctions
where bidders are not informed of the number of entrants before placing bids.
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Section 5 reports the results of additional experimental sessions which study auctions with
two, four and six bidders, where there is only public information available to the bidders.
Section 7 contains a concluding discussion.
2 Theory
We study the simplest framework which has not been previously studied and which is capable
of yielding robust insights. In particular, we examine first–price, sealed–bid auctions with
two bidders. The prize has a common but uncertain value x, where x denotes the realization
of a random variable X with uniform density on [25, 225]. The distribution from which the
prize is drawn is assumed to be common knowledge.
Prior to bidding, each bidder may (or may not) obtain a private signal regarding the
value of x. If a bidder observes a signal we say she is informed; if she does not we say she
is uninformed. We are interested in all the possible information structures that can arise
in such a game. In particular, we study auctions with an asymmetric information structure
(ASYM), in which only one bidder is informed, auctions where all information is symmetric
and public (SPUB), in which neither bidder is informed, and auctions where bidders are
ex–ante symmetric but there is private information (SPRIV), in which both bidders are
informed.
We denote a signal observed by bidder i as zi, which is a realization of the random variable
Zi. Each signal is an independent draw from a uniform distribution on [x− 8, x+ 8].6 The
ex–ante distribution of the signals, and which bidders will observe a signal, is common
knowledge.
In addition to whether or not the bidders play the (risk–neutral) Nash equilibrium, we
are interested in whether their bids exceed the break–even bidding threshold. We define this
threshold to be the bid above which a bidder is expected to earn a negative payoff conditional
on winning the auction and assuming the other bidder employs their equilibrium bidding
strategy.7 In SPRIV auctions such bidding behavior is referred to as the winner’s curse, and
6We use this distribution of values and signals for comparability with the existing literature.
7This is a conservative definition of the break–even bidding threshold. In particular, depending on the
relevant information structure, it need not be necessary to assume that the opposing bidder bids according
to equilibrium. For example, when the opposing bidder is not informed, the expected payoff of a bidder
conditional on winning the auction does not depend on the strategy of the other bidder. As such, the
break–even threshold could equivalently be defined as simply the expected payoff conditional on winning the
auction. When the opposing bidder is informed, the strategy of the other bidder is relevant to the expected
payoff conditional on winning. In SPRIV auctions, the break–even bidding threshold is typically defined
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its prevalence is the subject of a large literature.8
We also examine the information rent earned by informed bidders, which we define as
the difference between a bidder’s expected payoff when she is informed and when she is not,
all else constant. As will be discussed in more detail below, the equilibrium expected payoff
of a bidder who does not observe a signal is always zero. Thus, the information rent of an
informed bidder is simply her equilibrium expected payoff.
2.1 Asymmetric information structure (ASYM)
Consider the case in which only one bidder is informed. We denote her signal as zI (a
realization of ZI with distribution FZI ). Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) provide the
unique risk–neutral Nash equilibrium of this game.9 The risk–neutral Nash equilibrium bid
function of the informed bidder is given by
β (zI) =

zI
3
+ 58
3
if zI ∈ [17, 33)
zI
2
+ 75
6
+m (zI) if zI ∈ [33, 217)
zI
3
+ 442
3
+ n (zI) if zI ∈ [217, 233] ,
where m (zI) =
32
3(zI−25) is the nonlinear portion of the equilibrium bid function when
zI ∈ [33, 217) and n (zI) = 13
(
15200
zI−313 − 8800zI−153
)
is the nonlinear portion of the equilibrium
bid function when zI ∈ [217, 233].
In equilibrium, the uninformed bidder employs a mixed strategy such that her distribution
of bids is identical to the ex–ante bid distribution of the informed bidder.10 We denote the
under the assumption that the bidder with the highest signal will always win, which may involve bidders
employing non–equilibrium strategies (see e.g., Casari et al. (2007)). For uninformed ASYM bidders, even if
the informed bidder employs a monotonic equilibrium bidding strategy the expected value of the good to a
winning uninformed bidder depends on the strategy of the informed bidder. Thus, we define the threshold
assuming equilibrium bidding on the part of the opposing bidder, and apply this definition for all types of
bidders for consistency.
8See e.g., Kagel and Levin (2002), Casari et al. (2007), Kagel and Richard (2001) and Kagel and Levin
(1999).
9The derivations of the equilibrium bidding strategy, expected payoffs and expected revenue are found in
Appendix A.
10While the informed bidder’s equilibrium ex–ante bid distribution is the same as that of the uninformed
bidder, it is not generally the case that the uninformed bidder’s best response is to choose a bid distribution
which is identical to that of the informed bidder, or vice versa.
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distribution function of this mixed strategy as Q, with support on [25, 125], given by
Q (b) = Prob [β (ZI) ≤ b]
= FZI (β
−1 (b)) .
Since, in equilibrium, the uninformed bidder employs a mixed strategy, it must be the
case that the expected payoff of any bid in the support of this strategy yields the same
expected payoff. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) demonstrate that the uninformed bidder
wins only when the informed bidder’s signal indicates that x is low, such that the expected
payoff of the uninformed bidder is zero conditional on winning the auction. This implies
that the ex–ante expected payoff of the uninformed bidder is also zero.
Interestingly, these equilibrium predictions are largely unchanged when the number of
uninformed bidders increases.11 Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) show that the unique class
of equilibria in such a game involves the informed bidder bidding according to β(zI), and
the uninformed bidders choosing bids on the support [25, 125] such that the bid distribution
of the maximum uninformed bid is equal to that of Q(b). Both the predicted revenue and
the equilibrium payoffs of informed and uninformed bidders is not affected by the number of
uninformed bidders. Determining whether or not the behavior of the informed bidder in the
lab is invariant to the number of uninformed bidders would be, in our view, an interesting
avenue for future research.
The ex–ante expected payoff of the informed bidder, which is also her information rent,
is 33.23.12 Since the expected revenue of an ASYM auction is the expected value of the
prize, less the ex–ante expected payoffs of both bidders, this implies that expected revenue
is 125− 33.23− 0 = 91.77.
Assuming equilibrium bidding on the part of the informed bidder, the uninformed bidder
has an expected payoff of zero for any bid b ∈ [25, 125], and a negative expected payoff for
any b > 125. Hence, 125 is the break–even bidding threshold for the uninformed bidder, as
bidding above it guarantees a negative expected payoff, when facing an informed bidder who
bids according to equilibrium.13
11It would also be interesting to theoretically consider the case in which there are multiple informed
bidders. However, Hendricks et al. (1987) and Hendricks and Porter (1988) find that, in the field, auctions
with more than one informed bidder are relatively rare. They hypothesize that this is due to a bid rotation
scheme on the part of informed firms. To the best of our knowledge this case has not yet been studied
theoretically.
12Throughout the paper, decimal numbers are rounded off to two decimal places.
13Note that this would also be the break–even bidding threshold for all uninformed bidders in a game in
where the number of uninformed bidders were increased.
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For the informed bidder, the expected value of the prize conditional on zI is the same
as the expected value of the prize conditional on zI and having won the auction, regardless
of the strategy employed by the uninformed bidder.14 This is because she observes the only
signal. Thus, winning the auction does not imply that her signal exceeds any other signal (as
is the case when more than one bidder is informed). Thus, the break–even bidding threshold
for an informed ASYM bidder is
E (X | ZI = zI) =

zI+33
2
if zI ∈ [17, 33)
zI if zI ∈ [33, 217)
zI+217
2
if zI ∈ [217, 233] .
2.2 Symmetric and public information structure (SPUB)
When neither bidder observes a signal the unique risk–neutral Nash equilibrium is for both
bidders to bid E (X) = 125. To see this, note that if either bidder were to bid above 125,
they would earn negative expected profits conditional on winning. For any bid b < 125, the
other bidder would have an incentive to bid b+  < 125, and earn a positive expected profit.
Hence, no bid below 125 is consistent with Nash equilibrium.15
The expected revenue generated by the auction is 125 and the expected profit of both
bidders is equal to 0. This implies that 125 is also the break–even bidding threshold.
Note that if the number of bidders were to increase, the unique symmetric equilibrium
would be unchanged.16 Thus, any increase in the number of bidders would not affect the
revenue or payoff predictions. Further, the break–even bidding strategy would be unchanged.
2.3 Symmetric and private information structure (SPRIV)
We now consider the case in which both bidders are informed. Information in this envi-
ronment is ex–ante symmetric.17 The equilibrium of this game can be obtained by suitably
specializing the results in Milgrom and Weber (1982).18 This gives the risk neutral Nash
14Note that this is also true if there are multiple uninformed bidders.
15Interestingly, this unique equilibrium involves all bidders playing a weakly dominated strategy. In
particular, any bid below 125 weakly dominates a bid of 125.
16In addition to the unique symmetric equilibrium there exist an infinite number of asymmetric equilibria
in which two bidders bid 125, and the remaining bidders choose any strategy with support on [0, 125].
17This information structure is used throughout much of the experimental literature on common–value
auctions. See, e.g., Casari et al. (2007). Our setup differs in the parameter choice as well as in the number
of bidders.
18Derivations of the symmetric risk–neutral Nash equilibrium bid function, as well as the corresponding
revenue and payoffs predictions, are found in Appendix A. Similar derivations can be found in Kagel and
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equilibrium bid function to be
γ (zi) =

1
3
(zi + 58) if zi ∈ [17, 33)
zi − 8 + g (zi) if zi ∈ [33, 217)
zi
3
+ 142 + h (zi) if zi ∈ [217, 233]
where g (zi) =
16
3
exp
[
1
8
(33− zi)
]
is the nonlinear portion of the bid function when zi ∈
[33, 217), and h (zi) =
4096
3(zi−201)2 exp(23) −
4096
3(zi−201)2 is the nonlinear part of the bid function
when zi ∈ [217, 233].
Notice that the equilibrium bid function is monotonically increasing. Further, bidders
bid less than the expected value of the good conditional on their signal. This is due in part to
bidders accounting for the fact that the bidder with the highest signal will win the auction.
As such, in equilibrium each bidder uses their signal as a first order statistic when forming
beliefs regarding the expected payoff of winning the auction.19
The ex–ante expected payoff of either bidder, and thus the corresponding information
rent, is 2.50. The expected revenue of this auction is the expected value of the prize, less the
expected payoffs of the bidders, which is equal to 120. Note that SPRIV auctions generate
lower expected revenue that SPUB auctions due to the private information held by the
bidders in the former. Also, in ASYM auctions the expected revenue is lower than in both
symmetric information structures.
In an SPRIV auction, each bidder receives a signal regarding x. Since the equilibrium
bid function is monotonically increasing in the signal, the break–even bidding threshold is
equal to the expected value of the good conditional on having the highest signal. That
is, bidder i is bidding above the break–even bidding threshold when she bids more than
Levin (2002), and in Kagel and Richard (2001). Derivations of expected revenue and expected payoffs are
also in Appendix A.
19If there are more than two bidders, then the resulting equilibrium bid function accounts for two things.
First, the increase in the level of competition in the auction. Second, the fact that winning the auction
means that the winning bidder’s signal is the highest of a large number of signals. For a complete and
thorough analysis, we refer the reader to Kagel and Richard (2001). On the interval [33, 217], where most of
our observations are, the equilibrium bid function is given by zi − 8 + 16n+1exp
(−n
16 (zi − 33)
)
. Note that the
negative exponential term, which depends on n, decreases in magnitude as the signal increases. However,
an increase in n will, in expectation, increase the revenue generated by the auction, as well as decrease the
expected payoffs of the bidders.
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E (X | Zi = zi > Zj).20 For each bidder, this threshold is
E (X | Zi = zi > Zj) =

1
3
(zi + 58) if zi ∈ [17, 33)
zi − 83 if zi ∈ [33, 217)
zi(zi+257)−92570
3(zi−201) if zi ∈ [217, 233] .
3 Experimental design
Participants are put into matching groups of 10 and randomly and anonymously matched into
pairs. Each pair participates in a first–price, sealed–bid auction. Participants are randomly
and anonymously re–matched after each round. This process is repeated for thirty rounds.21
We employ a 3×1 between–subject design which varies the information observed by bidders
prior to placing their bids.
1. Asymmetric information structure (ASYM): Only one of the bidders is randomly cho-
sen to observe a private signal. Since the informed bidder is randomly determined in
each auction, bidders change roles throughout each session.
2. Symmetric and public information structure (SPUB): Neither bidder observes a private
signal.
3. Symmetric and private information structure (SPRIV): Both bidders observe a private
signal.
In each of these three treatments, the information structure is common knowledge. If
a bidder is informed, she observes her signal before bids are placed. Bids are between zero
and 225, inclusive, and are restricted to be multiples of 0.01. At the conclusion of each
20If there is an increase in the number of bidders, then the winning bidder will have the highest of a larger
number of signals. As such, the break–even bidding threshold is decreasing in the number of signals.
21Since matching of participants occurred within groups of ten, and thirty rounds were conducted, partic-
ipants were inevitably matched together more than once. However, participants were anonymously matched
so that it would be difficult for subjects to build a reputation. Further, multiple sessions were usually run
at the same time, so that there were twenty or thirty participants in the room, and participants were not
informed that they would only interact within a group of ten. Botelho et al. (2009) shows, in the context
of a public goods game, that when subjects are randomly re–matched such that they will be grouped with
some subjects in multiple rounds they behave differently than if they never interact with any subject more
than once. Thus, our random re–matching protocol may affect behavior. However, this matching protocol
was used in all three treatments, so any effect is likely to be the same in all three information structures
studied.
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auction each bidder observes both bids, the earnings of both bidders, their own balance and,
if applicable, the signal(s).22
We examine two–bidder auctions for several reasons. First, in ASYM auctions, the equi-
librium bid function of the informed bidder does not depend on the number of bidders. The
expected payoffs of bidders in ASYM auctions (and hence, expected revenue) also does not
depend on the number of bidders. Second, in SPUB auctions, symmetric Nash equilibrium
bids and expected revenue are also invariant to the number of bidders. Third, SPRIV auc-
tions have been extensively examined in the experimental literature, but we are unaware of
any study which examines this information structure in a two–bidder context. Thus, our
SPRIV treatment provides insight not already found in the literature. Fourth, the two–
bidder case is the simplest environment in which all the possible information structures can
be studied. Lastly, as mentioned above, auctions with only two bidders are quite common
in both wildcat and drainage auctions.
All sessions were run at the Economic Research Laboratory (ERL) at Texas A&M Univer-
sity, and our participants were undergraduates of the institution. Sessions were run between
September of 2008 and October of 2009.23 No subject had previously participated in an
experiment on auctions. Five sessions were run for each of the three information struc-
tures, for a total of 150 subjects. The sessions were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher,
2007). The same draws of values and (when applicable) signals, were used in every session.
Participants were separated by dividers such that they could not interact outside of the
computerized interface. They were provided with instructions, which were read aloud by an
experimenter.24 After the instructions were read, questions were answered privately. Each
participant then individually answered a set of questions to ensure understanding of the
experimental procedure; their answers were checked by an experimenter who also answered
any remaining questions.25 Participants were provided with a history sheet which allowed
them to keep track of bids, earnings and, if applicable, signal(s) in each round. Each session
lasted approximately two hours. Each participant began with a starting balance of $20 to
22This level of ex–post observation has been widely used throughout the literature. Armantier (2004) finds
that the ex–post observation of bids, earnings and signals “homogenizes behavior, and accelerates learning
toward the Nash equilibrium” in common–value, first–price auctions with the SPRIV information structure.
Note that because bidder earnings are observed, bidders are able to also determine the realized value of the
prize.
23The sessions for the ASYM and SPRIV treatments were run during September and October of 2008.
The SPUB sessions were run the following October.
24The instructions for the ASYM treatment are found in Appendix B. Instructions for the remaining
treatments are available upon request.
25We did not begin the experiment until each subject correctly answered all these questions. We did not
collect data on which subjects initially answered some questions incorrectly.
10
cover any losses, although no participant went bankrupt. At the end of all thirty rounds,
each participant was paid their starting balance plus their cumulative earnings, as well as
a show–up fee of $5. The bids, signals and values were all denominated in Experimental
Dollars (ED), which were exchanged for cash at a rate of 160ED/$1. The average payoff was
$26.91, with a range between $23.31 and $32.33.
4 Results
4.1 Bidding behavior
Since subjects interact in groups of ten within a session, and are randomly rematched
throughout the thirty periods of the experiment, behavior within a given session is not
independent. To ensure that our analysis relies on independent observations we use session
level data in our non–parametric tests. Thus, we have five independent observations for each
of the three information structures we study. Unless specifically noted, results of a given test
are robust to restricting attention to the first or last third of the experiment.
There are four bidder types in our experiment. Table 1 contains summary statistics for
observed and predicted bidding behavior for each of these types, aggregated across all rounds
and sessions. For informed bidders, predicted bids are calculated using the realized signals,
rather than the ex–ante bid predictions.
Informed ASYM bidding is illustrated in Figure 1, which contains a scatter plot of bids
and the equilibrium bid function. Informed bidders in ASYM auctions overbid on average.
While in the first third of the experiment this is statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed–
rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02), it is consistent with Nash predictions by the last third of the
experiment (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 0.14, n.s.).26 This convergence to theoretical
predictions is further illustrated in Figure 2, which shows boxplots of bidding by period. This
figure also highlights that variation in overbidding decreases as bidders gain experience.
Informed bids are, on average, moving closer to Nash equilibrium predictions as partic-
ipants gain experience. However, if uninformed bidders are not bidding according to their
equilibrium bidding strategy, then equilibrium predictions are not a valid benchmark for
informed bidders. Referring to Table 1, note that uninformed bidders bid on average a full
23% below the expected value of their predicted strategy. Further, non–parametric tests
show that the observed and predicted bid distributions of the uninformed bidders are not
26When a test is not significant at conventional levels, we indicate this with the abbreviation n.s..
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equal (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, D = 0.63, p < 0.01)).27 Thus, uninformed ASYM bidders
are underbidding relative to Nash predictions.
This point is further illustrated in Figure 3, which compares the equilibrium distribution
of bids against the empirical distributions of both informed and uninformed bids. In the
first panel, all periods are considered. In the second and third panels attention is restricted
to the first and last ten periods, respectively. Note that even in the last third of the experi-
ment the distribution of uninformed ASYM bids is almost entirely to the left of equilibrium
predictions.28 Indeed, even in the last third of the experiment, when the distribution of bids
of the informed players is closer to that of the uninformed bidders, they are still statistically
different (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, D = 0.24, p < 0.01).29
The fact that uninformed ASYM bidders bid less than informed ASYM bidders suggests
that the informed bidders may be able to profitably reduce their bids. To investigate this
possibility we calculate the best response of the informed ASYM bidders to the empirical
distribution of the uninformed ASYM bids.30 We find that observed bids of informed ASYM
bidders exceed their best response (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02), and that
their observed payoff is less than their best response payoff as a result (Wilcoxon signed–rank
test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02). This is illustrated in Figure 4, which contains a scatterplot of the
difference between the observed bids of the informed ASYM bidders and the corresponding
best response, as well as a scatterplot of the difference between the observed payoffs of
the informed ASYM bidders and the corresponding best response payoff. Clearly, informed
bidders could profitably shade their bids more than is observed.31 In fact, the average
27This test uses individual bids as the unit of observation, as the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test requires a
relatively large number of observations to properly evaluate the null hypothesis. Using session level data, we
find that uninformed ASYM bids are, on average, lower than predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.75,
p = 0.04).
28While it is clear that uninformed ASYM bids do not conform to the mixed strategy prediction, it is
worth asking whether such bidders are mixing at all. We find strong evidence to the contrary. Participants
tend to choose the same bid in consecutive instances of being uninformed. Further, participants chose their
modal uninformed bid an average of 29% of the periods in which they are uninformed. Additionally, 82% of
uninformed ASYM bids are integers, and 59.47% are multiples of five.
29As above, this test uses individual bids as the unit of observation. As a robustness check, we also report
the results of a signed–rank test on session level data, which is consistent with the finding that informed
ASYM bids exceed those of uninformed ASYM bidders. The results do not differ when considering all
periods, the first ten periods, or the last ten periods (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02).
30When calculating this best response, we assume that ties are broken randomly, with both bidders having
a 50% chance of winning.
31The fact that informed ASYM bidders do not best respond to the empirical distribution of ASYM could
be due to the random re–matching protocol we use in our experiments. It would be interesting to study the
same information structure in an environment with a fixed matching protocol or a perfect strangers matching
protocol to investigate this question.
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difference between the observed and best response bids of the informed bidders is 10.50,
which is “money left on the table.”
Thus far, our experiment finds that uninformed ASYM bidders bid cautiously, although
the underlying reasons are unclear. One possibility is that this is in response to the in-
formational disadvantage they face. The bidding behavior in SPUB auctions allows us to
evaluate whether removing their strategic disadvantage would result in more aggressive bid-
ding. In the first ten periods we cannot reject that SPUB and uninformed ASYM bids are
equal (Robust rank order test, U´ = 1.32, n.s.). However, by the last ten periods, bidders in
SPUB auctions bid more than uninformed ASYM bidders (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d,
p < 0.01).32 In fact, we cannot reject that bidders in SPUB auctions bid, on average, the
same as informed ASYM bidders (Robust rank order test, U´ = 1.19, n.s.).33
It is important to note that, despite bidding more than uninformed ASYM bidders in the
last third, SPUB bidders underbid relative to Nash predictions. Further, this underbidding
is highly significant (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 6.15, p < 0.01). Figure 5 further
illustrates this point by showing boxplots of SPUB bids relative to Nash predictions over
all periods. Note that while underbidding decreases slightly in early periods, it persists
throughout the entire experiment. Further, the magnitude of this underbidding remains
dramatic throughout. Clearly, underbidding by uninformed bidders is robust to changes in
the information structure.
As far as we know, this is the first observed underbidding in single–unit, common–value
auctions. While such behavior is not so surprising in ASYM auctions where the uninformed
bidder is significantly disadvantaged, underbidding in SPUB auctions is puzzling since a
bidder could raise her bid, and obtain a large payoff on average. One concern is that the
observed underbidding is driven by a subset of subjects who bid close to zero in order to
withdraw from the auction. To investigate this, we calculate the average uninformed bid of
each bidder. The number of bidders with an average uninformed bid less than twenty–five
is only one in SPUB auctions, and only four in ASYM auctions. Figure 6 further illustrates
individual level bidding by uninformed bidders by presenting boxplots of bids, where each
box summarizes all the bids on an individual bidder. Note that while there is heterogeneity
32In the last ten periods, at the session level, the lowest average of SPUB bids is higher than the highest
average of uninformed ASYM bids. As such, the test statistic of the Robust rank order statistic is not
defined and p < 0.01. We will denote the test statistic by n.d. in such cases. Critical values for the Robust
rank order test can be found in Feltovich (2003).
33In the first ten periods SPUB bidders bid less than informed ASYM bidders (Robust rank order test,
U´ = 7.19, p < 0.01). However, by the last ten periods their bids do not differ (Robust rank order test,
U´ = 1.14, n.s.).
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in bidding, the average underbidding we observe is not driven by a subset of subjects who
bid at or close to zero.
The literature on common–value auctions typically finds that when all bidders are pri-
vately informed they bid above the break–even bidding threshold such that they obtain
negative profits in expectation (the winner’s curse). Such behavior is found both when the
information structure is asymmetric in the sense that one bidder obtains a more informative
signal than the others (Kagel and Levin, 1999; Harrison and List, 2008) and when bidders
are in an SPRIV information structure (Kagel and Levin, 2002).
The data from our SPRIV treatment thus provides a valuable basis for comparison with
the existing literature.34 Do we observe overbidding by bidders in SPRIV auctions? Do
these bidders fall victim to the winner’s curse? Figure 7 provides some insight by comparing
observed bids with the equilibrium bid function. Bidders overbid (Wilcoxon signed–rank test,
z = 1.75, p = 0.04).35 In fact, bidders in the SPRIV treatment bid more than any other type
we study.36 However, notice that the magnitude of deviations from Nash predictions is small.
This is a result of the signal structure. Since a signal can be at most eight experimental
units away from the true value, bidders easily ascertain that bidding more than eight above
their signal will result in negative earnings conditional on winning. Likewise, bidding more
than eight below their signal lowers the probability of winning. As such, 74% of bids in the
SPRIV treatment fall within eight experimental units of the signal. Figure 8 illustrates how
overbidding in SPRIV auctions changes over time. Of note is that even in the last periods
of the experiment, overbidding is prevalent.
Figure 8 illustrates that SPRIV bidders persistently overbid, but do they bid above the
break–even bidding threshold? Table 2 provides a breakdown of the relevant frequencies
for each type of bidder. Frequencies for all bidders and for winning bidders are reported.
Figure 9 illustrates how these frequencies change over time. Not only do SPRIV bidders
often bid in excess of the break–even threshold, they are the only type of bidder who do so
with non–trivial frequency in later periods.
34This comparison is possible because the only difference between the treatments is the information struc-
ture itself. However, it is possible that features of our design that are constant across all treatments drive
our results. Varying such features in a systematic way would provide valuable robustness checks, which we
leave for future research. For example, investigating the extent to which the random re–matching protocol
we use in our experimental design drives our results would be an interesting avenue for future research.
35If we restrict attention to the final ten periods, we cannot reject that SPRIV bids align with Nash
predictions (Robust rank order test, U´ = 1.48, n.s.).
36For all comparisons, the lowest session average of bids in an SPRIV auction was higher than the highest
session average of the type being compared. As such, the test statistic of the Robust rank order statistic is
undefined and p < 0.01.
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However, it is worth noting that the frequency with which SPRIV bidders bid in excess
of the break–even bidding threshold is lower than in other studies. This difference may be
attributable to the fact that we examine auctions with two bidders, while the rest of the
literature has examined environments with a larger number of bidders.37 As the number
of bidders increases the adverse selection problem increases; in order to win the auction a
bidder’s signal must be the largest of a larger number of signals, driving the break–even
bidding strategy down. Further, bidders tend to bid more aggressively when there is a larger
number of bidders.38
To further understand the determinants of bidding behavior we estimate bid functions
using random effects tobits to control for correlation of participant behavior over time, and
the fact that bids were restricted to be within the interval [0, 225]. We restrict our attention
to observations in which the observed signal (or the signal that a bidder would have observed
had she been informed) is in the interval [33, 217), where the majority of our observations
lie, as is typical in the literature.39 We include zit, the (possibly unobserved) signal of bidder
i in period t.40 When the equilibrium bid function for the relevant treatment is nonlinear,
we also control for the nonlinear portion. In the case of SPRIV auctions this nonlinear
portion is g (zit). For informed bidders in ASYM auctions, this nonlinear portion is m (zit).
We also control for gender (Mi = 1 if the participant is a male, and zero otherwise), and
bidder experience (ln (1 + t)). When jointly estimating bid functions SPRIVi, AINFi and
AUNFi are dummies for bidders in SPRIV auctions, informed bidders in ASYM auctions
and uninformed bidders in ASYM auctions, respectively.
Table 3 contains the estimates. As expected, the coefficient corresponding to the (unob-
served) signal is not significant for both SPUB and uninformed ASYM bidders. Conversely,
the coefficient for the (observed) signal is highly significant in the estimated bid function for
bidders in SPRIV auctions. Indeed, this coefficient is not significantly different than one.
Further, the nonlinear part of the bid function (g (zit)) is not significant. A similar result is
found for informed bidders in ASYM auctions: the coefficient of the signal is positive and
highly significant and the nonlinear portion of the bid function (m (zit)) is not significant.
Note that the magnitude of the coefficient on zit for informed ASYM bidders is significantly
less than one, indicating that while such bidders are not bidding according to the equilibrium
37n ∈ {4, 6, 7} are typical. Frequently, n is varied. See e.g., Kagel and Levin (1986).
38This behavior has been observed in many studies. See Kagel and Levin (2002).
39See e.g., Casari et al. (2007).
40The realized value of the good and the two signals are held constant across treatments. In some treat-
ments the bidder does not observe “her” signal. Thus, when a bidder is uninformed, there is a (unobserved)
signal assigned to her. We are interested in testing whether or not the signal is significant when it is not
observed.
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bid function, they do reduce their bids relative to the signal to (seemingly) account for the
cautious bidding of uninformed ASYM bidders.
Interestingly, the results regarding bidder experience (ln (1 + t)) differ substantially across
treatments. In SPUB auctions, the coefficient is positive and significant. This indicates that
SPUB bidders are learning to bid closer to equilibrium as they gain experience. In the
ASYM treatment the coefficients for both informed and uninformed bidders are negative
and significant; they are reducing their bids as they gain experience. In the case of SPRIV
bidders, learning is not significantly different from zero.
Interestingly, we also find that gender effects only exist when a bidder is informed. In
particular, males bid significantly less than females when they are informed. However, un-
informed ASYM bidders and SPUB bidders do not exhibit gender differences in bidding.
4.2 Payoffs
Table 4 reports summary statistics for bidder payoffs. The average predicted payoff of
informed bidders in ASYM and SPRIV auctions was calculated using the signals observed
by participants, rather than the ex–ante expected payoffs to maximize comparability.
Note that uninformed bidders in ASYM auctions are losing money on average, although
payoffs are not significantly different than the prediction of zero (Wilcoxon signed–rank
test, z = 0.94, n.s.).41 Given this, one might expect that these bidders would simply bid
zero. However, the strategic implications of such a bid make this outcome unlikely. If the
uninformed bidder bids zero, then the informed bidder can win with certainty by bidding
an arbitrarily small amount. Given this, the uninformed bidder’s best response would be to
bid marginally more than this, and so on. This intuition is borne out by our data: 96.4%
of uninformed ASYM bidders bid positive amounts. It is important to note that Hendricks
et al. (1987) and Hendricks and Porter (1988) report that the uninformed bidders in drainage
auctions earned profits of approximately zero, which is in line with our data.
Are informed bidders better off for having observed a signal? Equivalently, are informed
bidders earning an information rent? For informed bidders in ASYM auctions the answer is
yes; they earn more than bidders in SPUB auctions (Robust rank order test, U´ = 7.19, p <
0.01). This is despite the observed underbidding in SPUB auctions. For bidders in SPRIV
41In the first ten periods, uninformed ASYM bidders have negative payoffs on average (Wilcoxon signed–
rank test, z = 1.75, p = 0.04). However, by the last ten periods they earn their predicted payoff of zero
(Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 0.14, n.s.).
16
auctions the answer is no; we are unable to reject equality of payoffs between bidders in
SPRIV bidders and uninformed bidders in ASYM auctions (Robust rank order test, U´ = 1.14,
n.s.).42 This is largely due to the presence of the winner’s curse in SPRIV auctions, which
lowers their payoff relative to predictions (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.75, p = 0.04).43
It may be noted that the standard deviation of payoffs for a bidder in SPRIV auctions is
much lower than that of an uninformed bidder in ASYM auctions, owing largely to the
relatively high level of precision of the signals.
Perhaps not surprisingly, and in accordance with theory, informed bidders in ASYM
auctions earn more than their uninformed counterparts (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02,
p = 0.02). Likewise they earn more than bidders in SPRIV auctions (Robust rank order
test, U´ = n.d., p < 0.01). Further, we are unable to reject that informed bidders in ASYM
auctions earn their predicted payoff (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 0.41, n.s.).44 This
is not surprising, since informed bidding in ASYM auctions does not dramatically deviate
from predictions, and these bidders do not shade their bids as much as the underbidding of
uninformed ASYM bidders would permit.
When considering SPUB bidders, however, theory falls far short. Due to the dramatic
underbidding of SPUB bidders, they earn more than predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test,
z = 2.02, p = 0.02). In addition, not only do they do better than uninformed bidders in
ASYM auctions (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d., p < 0.01), but they also earn more
than bidders in SPRIV auctions (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d., p < 0.01). That is, in
symmetric information structures, bidders are better off in ignorance!
4.3 Revenue
Table 5 reports summary statistics of revenue. Predicted revenue is calculated using the
realized signals, when applicable. Theory predicts that the asymmetric information struc-
ture will reduce revenue regardless of which symmetric information structure serves as a
baseline.45
42If attention is restricted to the first ten periods, then SPRIV bidders earn more than uninformed ASYM
bidders (Robust rank order test, U´ = 2.06, p = 0.05).
43By the final ten periods, the prevalence of the winner’s curse has reduced, such that we cannot reject
that SPRIV payoffs are in line with theory (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 0.67, n.s.).
44This result is largely driven by the fact that in the first ten rounds informed ASYM bidders earn less
than predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.75, p = 0.04), while in the last ten periods they earn more
(Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.48, p = 0.07).
45Having some bidders be better informed than others is not always predicted to decrease revenue. Camp-
bell and Levin (2000) provide an example in a discrete environment where the presence of a better informed
bidder can increase revenue relative to a case where less informed bidders have identically distributed private
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Our experiment suggests this is not the case. We find strong support for the prediction
that SPRIV auctions revenue dominate ASYM auctions (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d.,
p < 0.01). This is driven by the fact that revenue in SPRIV auctions is higher than pre-
dicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02). Furthermore, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that revenue in ASYM auctions is equal to predictions (Wilcoxon signed–rank
test, z = 0.14, p = 0.89).46
However, the underbidding we observe in SPUB auctions dramatically reduces its revenue
relative to theory (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02) such that we are unable
to reject revenue equivalence between SPUB and ASYM auctions (Robust rank order test,
U´ = 0.47, n.s.).47 Further, the underbidding in SPUB auctions, combined with the winner’s
curse in SPRIV auctions flips the revenue ranking between the two symmetric information
structures. Revenue is higher in SPRIV auctions (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d., p <
0.01).
5 SPUB auctions with more than two bidders
As discussed above, our experimental design focuses on two–bidder environments in large
part because it is the simplest possible setup that allows us to examine all the possible
combinations of informed and uninformed bidders. We have shown that bids in SPUB
auctions with two bidders are dramatically below predictions, and that bidders rarely fall
victim to the winner’s curse.
This surprising result suggests two questions. First, are these results replicable? Second,
are these results a consequence of restricting attention to two–bidder environments? To
address these issues, we ran several additional sessions, which vary the number of bidders in
common–value auctions with an SPUB information structure.
In particular, we ran five sessions of SPUB auctions with two bidders, five sessions with
four bidders, and five sessions with six bidders. In all of these sessions there were exactly
signals. Kagel and Levin (1999) find that the presence of a better informed bidder increases revenue relative
to an SPRIV information structure when less informed bidders observe conditionally independent signals and
the better informed bidder observes the realized value. Both Kagel and Levin (1999) and Harrison and List
(2008) find support for this prediction in experimental settings where values are induced and thus observed
by the experimenters.
46This is driven by the fact that in the first ten periods ASYM auctions generate more revenue than
predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.75, p = 0.04), while the opposite is true in the last ten periods
(Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.75, p = 0.04).
47In the first ten periods ASYM auctions generate more revenue than SPUB auctions (Robust rank order
test, U´ = 7.19,p < 0.01), but there is no significant revenue difference by the last ten periods (Robust rank
order test, U´ = 0.92, n.s.).
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three auctions run simultaneously in any given period. Thus, there were six subjects in two–
bidder sessions, twelve subjects in four–bidder sessions, and eighteen subjects in six–bidder
sessions. We used the same draws of the value of the good across all of these sessions.48 That
is, in each period there are three draws which correspond to the value of the good in each of
the three auctions in that period. All of these sessions were run at Centro Vernon Smith de
Economı´a Experimental at Universidad Francisco Marroqu´ın in October and November of
2016. All other features of these sessions are the same as in the SPUB sessions we initially
ran at Texas A&M University.
Table 6 reports summary statistics of both the bids and the payoffs of the winning bidders
in these sessions. We replicate the finding that there is underbidding in SPUB auctions with
two bidders (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02). As a result, the payoffs of
winning bidders in such auctions are also greater than predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank
test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02). Table 7 shows the frequency of bids above the break–even
bidding threshold, both for all bidders and winning bidders. Note that we also replicate the
finding that bids above the break–even bidding threshold are not common when there are
two bidders.
Interestingly, when the number of bidders is increased to four there is still underbidding
on average (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02), such that the payoffs continue
to be greater than predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 1.75, p = 0.04). However, note
that bids have increased relative to the two–bidder case (Robust rank order test, U´ = 3.16,
p < 0.05). As a result payoffs have fallen relative to the two–bidder case (Robust rank order
test, U´ = n.d, p < 0.01). Further, note that the frequency of bids above the break–even
bidding threshold has also increased relative to the two–bidder case (Robust rank order test,
U´ = 6.095, p < 0.03).
When the number of bidders is increased to six, bids continue to be, on average, less than
predicted (Wilcoxon signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02). However, bids are higher than in
both the two–bidder case (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d., p < 0.01) and the four–bidder
case (Robust rank order test, U´ = 4.20, p < 0.03). Indeed, the frequency with which bids
exceed the break–even bidding threshold results in lower payoffs than predicted (Wilcoxon
signed–rank test, z = 2.02, p = 0.02). That is, payoffs in the six–bidder case are negative.49
48There were thirty subjects who participated in sessions with two–bidder auctions, sixty subjects who
participated in sessions with four–bidder auctions and ninety subjects who participated in sessions with
six–bidder auctions.
49Not surprisingly, payoffs in the six–bidder case are significantly lower than in both the two–bidder case
(Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d, p < 0.01) and the four–bidder case (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d,
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To summarize, average bids are monotonically increasing in the number of bidders. This
is illustrated in Figure 10, which contains line graphs of average bids in each of these three
group sizes by period. Note that the average bid is less than the unique symmetric Nash
bid in all cases. As a result of bids increasing in the number of bidders, average payoffs of
bidders are monotonically decreasing in the number of bidders. This is illustrated in Figure
12, which shows the average payoff of winning bidders by period.50 The fact that the payoffs
of winning bidders become negative when there are six bidders is driven by the frequency
with which bids exceed the break–even bidding threshold, as illustrated in Figure 9.
The fact that average bids are increasing in the number of bidders is similar to the results
from the literature similar to our SPRIV treatment.51 In our view, investigating whether
bids are increasing in the number of bidders in other environments is an interesting avenue
for future research, especially in information structures similar to our ASYM treatment.
6 Alternative bidding models
Our most surprising result is the persistent and dramatic underbidding by uninformed bid-
ders. In order to explain the non–equilibrium behavior we observe, any explanation must
simultaneously account for underbidding by uninformed bidders in ASYM and SPUB auc-
tions and overbidding in SPRIV auctions. In what follows, we assess the ability of several
alternative bidding models to explain our data.
One possibility is collusion. In particular, when n ∈ {2, 4}, SPUB bidders had positive
payoffs, and may have been explicitly or implicitly colluding. However, since participants
were separated by dividers, were monitored by experimenters to prevent communication, and
were randomly and anonymously re–matched every period, this seems unlikely. Further, if
bidders were able to collude in some treatments we would expect to see similar collusion in
the other treatments. Since colluding bidders in SPRIV auctions would not overbid, collusion
is unable to explain the data.
A potential explanation for our data is that bidders are not risk neutral, as assumed
in the theory. To explore if violations of risk neutrality can explain our data, we consider
symmetric equilibria in SPUB auctions assuming that preferences are homogeneous and
p < 0.01). Likewise, the frequency of bids in excess of the break–even bidding threshold is greater in the
six–bidder case than in the two–bidder case (Robust rank order test, U´ = n.d., p < 0.01) or the four–bidder
case (Robust rank order test, U´ = 6.574, p < 0.03).
50Since the number of bidders is varied, focusing on the average payoff of all bidders would give misleading
results, as each losing bidder obtains a payoff of zero.
51See e.g., Kagel and Levin (1986).
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common knowledge. Since losses are possible in this environment, we need a utility function
that is defined over both gains and losses. For simplicity we use the following
u (x) =
xα x ≥ 0−λxβ x < 0.
For the sake of brevity, we relegate a detailed discussion of equilibrium under risk to
Appendix C. Interestingly, the bid predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium does not
depend on the number of bidders. Since we observe that, on average, SPUB bids increase
in the number of bidders, our data is not able to be explained by this model. Nonetheless,
we calculate equilibrium predictions under several assumptions about α, λ and β. First, we
consider the case where α = β and λ = 1. In this case, bidders are not loss averse, and the
curvature of the utility function is the same over gains and losses. In this case, the unique
symmetric equilibrium is the same as in the risk neutral case. Next, we consider the case
where bidders are loss averse. Using the utility function parameters estimated by Harrison
and Rutstro¨m (2009), we find the symmetric equilibrium bid in this case to be 115.70.52
Since observed bids are well below this when n = 2, we again conclude that risk and loss
aversion are not able to explain bidding behavior in SPUB auctions.
A prominent explanation for the winner’s curse is the notion of a cursed equilibrium
(Eyster and Rabin, 2005), in which boundedly rational bidders are assumed to incorrectly
believe that with some probability the other bidders will ignore their private information and
bid the average of their type contingent strategy. In such an equilibrium, bidders believe
that winning the auction need not be bad news regarding the value, and consequently do
not shade their bids as aggressively as predicted by the Nash equilibrium. However, cursed
equilibrium only differs from Nash equilibrium when (at least some) bidders hold private
information. As such, it is unable to explain underbidding by players in SPUB auctions.
Next we consider whether a level–k model of reasoning can explain observed behavior.
Level–k models have previously been applied to auctions by (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007).
In such models, each bidder is associated with a level of reasoning. Level zero bidders are
assumed to bid naively (often this is assumed to be uniform randomization), level one bidders
best respond to their (presumably incorrect) beliefs that all other bidders are level zero, level
two bidders best respond to their beliefs that all other bidders are level one, and so on. The
key assumption of such models is that all types are overconfident in the sense that they
believe all other bidders to be one level below their own.
52In Appendix C we also consider the case of risk and loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting.
Adding nonlinear probability weighting only changes the equilibrium bid slightly.
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In an SPUB auction a level one bidder believes that level zero bidders are uniformly
randomizing on [25, 225]. When n = 2, a level one bidder best responds with a bid of 75.
In an SPUB auction with n = 4, a level one bidder best responds with a bid of 100 and
when n = 6 a level one bidder best responds with a bid of 108.33. A level two bidder best
responds to her belief that all other bidders are level one by bidding 0.01 above the bid of
a level one bidder.53 Level three bidders bid 0.01 above that of level two bidders, and so
on. Comparing these predictions with the observed SPUB data summarized in Table 6, it
is clear that a level–k model of reasoning is, on the surface, qualitatively in line with our
SPUB data. In particular, it is able to account for both the observed underbidding, as well
as the fact that this underbidding decreases as the number of bidders increase.
To investigate the ability of such a model to explain our data further, we estimate the
proportion of levels in our SPUB data, using maximum likelihood. Following Crawford
and Iriberri (2007), we assume that bidders are no higher than level two. We allow the
proportions of levels to vary with the number of bidders in the auction. For a detailed
discussion of our estimation procedure and results, please see Appendix D. In a model in
which level zero bidders are excluded, the estimation finds that well over 90% of bidders are
level one, regardless of the number of bidders. However, none of the estimated proportions
of level one or level two bidders are statistically significantly different from zero. In a model
which includes level zero bidders, the Hessian is non–invertible, such that the standard errors
are not computable. The point estimates suggest that there is a relatively small proportion
of bidders who are level zero, with the remaining bidders being level one; the proportion of
level two bidders was zero, regardless of the number of bidders. However, since the standard
errors are not available, we are unable to conclude that these estimates are meaningful.
The difficulty in estimating the proportions of each level of bidder may be driven by the
fact that is quite difficult to distinguish between level one bidders and level two bidders, as
the corresponding bid predictions are extremely close. In our view, a promising avenue for
future research is a SPUB environment with a more coarsely discretized bid space, such that
levels are more easily distinguished.
7 Discussion
One of the most celebrated and robust results in the experimental literature on common–
value auctions is the winner’s curse. It has been found to be robust to changes in information
53This assumes that the bid space is discretized to two decimal places. If the bid space is a continuum,
the best response to these beliefs does not exist.
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structure (Kagel and Levin, 1999), publicly providing an additional signal to all bidders
(Kagel and Levin, 1986), among others. However, common to all these studies is that all
bidders observe private information.
When noting strong evidence for equilibrium bidding behavior in drainage auctions, Hen-
dricks et al. (1989) note that: “These results raise some questions about experimental work
on the bidding behavior in common value auctions. All of the studies that we are familiar
with report that bidders suffer from the ‘winner’s curse.’ Whether this is due to the inex-
perience of the subjects, the relatively small stakes, or structural features of the auction are
issues worth pursuing.” Our findings suggest that the structural feature responsible for the
widespread observation of the winner’s curse may be the fact that all bidders have private
information in the existing literature.
This raises important questions regarding how to determine whether or not bidders hold
private information in the field. Given that the behavior of informed and uninformed bidders
differs so significantly, making the correct assumption is important. This issue is not clear
cut, as in the literature we observe instances in which bidders who have access to the same
type of information are sometimes assumed to be informed, and other times uninformed. For
example, non–neighbor firms in drainage auctions and bidders in wildcat auctions only have
access to public seismic information for the plot to be leased prior to bidding. Non–neighbor
firms are assumed to be uninformed in Hendricks et al. (1987), Hendricks and Porter (1988),
Hendricks et al. (1989) and Hendricks et al. (1994), and these papers find considerable sup-
port for this assumption. However, when analyzing wildcat auctions Hendricks et al. (1987)
and Hendricks et al. (2003) assume that all bidders are privately informed. Another example
can be found in Harrison and List (2008) who report the results of a field experiment regard-
ing bidding for packs of sports cards. Although bidders only handled the same unopened
pack of cards prior to bidding, they were assumed to be privately informed.
In the real world situations arguably involving only public information regarding the value
of the good arise frequently. Bidders have private estimates of the value, but had access to
the same information about the value when forming these estimates. For example, if a book
proposal is distributed among various publishers, who may subsequently make offers, it is
reasonable to think that all publishers have access to the same information (assuming for the
sake of argument that they have no information beyond the proposal itself). If their estimates
differ, they must use different methods to form them. Given that our results suggest that
behavior differs significantly between informed and uninformed bidders, making the correct
assumption when formulating policy recommendations is crucial. Do bidders in fact hold
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private information on which they condition their bids, or do they each use the same public
information to form possibly different beliefs?
In practice, whether or not bids are meaningfully correlated with the ex–post value may
offer some guidance. If bidders are uninformed, then they are only able to condition their
bids on the expected value conditional on available public information. They have no way
of further relating their bids to the realized value. Thus, if bids are uncorrelated with the
value, it is reasonable to assume that bidders are uninformed. An important example is
found in Hendricks and Porter (1988) which finds that the bids of non–neighbor firms in
drainage auctions are uncorrelated with the ex–post value of the lease.
Turning now to information rents, recall that theory predicts that both uninformed bid-
ders in ASYM and SPUB auctions will earn an expected profit of zero. Thus, the information
rent of an informed bidder in an ASYM auction is, in theory, a consequence of a reduction in
revenue relative to the SPUB case.54 However, since we are unable to reject revenue equiv-
alence between the SPUB and ASYM information structures, we find that the informed
ASYM information rent is derived at the expense of the other bidder, rather than from the
seller.
Our results regarding payoffs have interesting implications for a modified game in which
both bidders simultaneously decide whether or not to purchase a signal prior to the auction.
Theory predicts that acquiring a signal is strictly dominant, provided the cost is less than
the ex–ante expected payoff of an SPRIV bidder. Consequently, we would expect an SPRIV
information structure in the subsequent auction. However, since we do not observe a signif-
icant difference in the payoffs of SPRIV and uninformed ASYM bidders, our data suggests
that even a small cost of acquiring a signal would change the predicted information structure.
In particular, taking observed payoffs in the three information structures as given, there are
two equilibria in the information acquisition stage which correspond to both possible ASYM
information structures. In our view, experimental analysis of this information acquisition
game would be an interesting avenue for future research.
It is noteworthy that, contrary to predictions, increasing the degree of competition in auc-
tions with an SPUB information structure affects both the bids and payoffs of participants.
Our data suggests that there may be a threshold number of bidders above which bids become
aggressive enough that payoffs become negative. However, the number of bidders observed
in the field is often low. Revisiting the data used by Hendricks, Porter and co–authors, we
54This follows from the fact that a common–value auction without a reservation price is a zero–sum game
between the bidders and the seller.
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find that an overwhelming majority of auctions attracted less than seven bidders. In fact,
auctions with only four or less bidders account for 89% of drainage auctions and 73% of
wildcat auctions. Given this, one would expect to see underbidding and positive payoffs in
the corresponding auctions. The relatively low number of bidders in wildcat tracts could
also explain the relative dearth of winning bidders with negative payoffs in these auctions. It
must be noted, however, that our data is a preliminary first step, and additional work must
be done before drawing strong conclusions about the applicability of our results to the field.
The primary contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the behavior of bidders
who only observe public information differs dramatically from those who additionally have
access to private information. This paper is a first step in a much needed analysis of bidding
behavior with only public information.
A Derivations
A.1 Preliminaries
The common value of the available good, x, is a realization of a random variable X with a
uniform distribution with support [x, x]. The realization of this value, x, is not observed by
the two bidders before placing their bids. However, the distribution from which it is drawn
is common knowledge.
In an SPRIV auction, bidder i ∈ {1, 2} observes an estimate of the realized value of
the good. Each estimate is the realization of X plus an error term Xi. This error term
is U (−δ, δ), and is independent of X and X−i. That is, each estimate is a realization of
Zi = X+Xi. We denote the distribution function of Zi as FZi . Notice that Zi is independent
of Z−i, conditional on the realization of X. Throughout, we use fA to denote the density
function of the random variable A. A joint density function will be denoted as f (x) where
the vector x indicates the random variables for which f (x) pertains.
A.2 Symmetric and private information structure (SPRIV)
The derivations to find the symmetric Nash equilibrium bid function can be found in Kagel
and Levin (2002) and Kagel and Richard (2001). Assume that bidder j 6= i bids according to
the symmetric Nash equilibrium bid function, γ (zj). Consider bidder i who observes a signal
zi but bids as though she observed y. If a (zi) = max (x, zi − δ) and b (zi) = min (x, zi + δ),
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then the expected payoff of such a bidder is as follows:
Π (zi, y) =
∫ b(zi)
a(zi)
(x− γ (y))FZi|X (y | x) fX|Zi (x | zi) dx
=
∫ b(zi)
a(zi)
(x− γ (y))
(
y − x+ δ
2δ
)(
1
b (zi)− a (zi)
)
dx.
The revelation principle tells us that:
dΠ (zi, y)
dy
|y=zi= 0.
Using the initial condition γ (x− δ) = x and assuming continuity of the equilibrium bid
function yields the solution:
γ (zi) =

x+ 1
3
(zi − x+ δ) if zi ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ)
zi − δ + 2δ3 exp
[
1
δ
(x+ δ − zi)
]
if zi ∈ [x+ δ, x− δ)
2x3+z3i+3δz
2
i−9δ2zi+12δx(zi+3δ)−3x2(zi+5δ)+δ3(8 exp[ 2δ+x−xδ ]−35)
3(zi−x+3δ)2 if zi ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ] .
The expected payoff of bidder i when she observes a private signal zi is
ΠSPRIVi (zi) =
∫ b(zi)
a(zi)
(x− γ (zi))FZi|X (zi | x) fX|Zi (x | zi) dx
=
∫ b(zi)
a(zi)
(x− γ (zi))
(
zi − x+ δ
2δ
)(
1
b (zi)− a (zi)
)
dx.
This simplifies to
ΠSPRIVi (zi) =

0 if zi ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ)
δ
3
(
1− exp
(
x−zi+δ
δ
))
if zi ∈ [x+ δ, x− δ)
x2+z2i+4ziδ+δ
2(5−2 exp(2− (x−x)δ ))−2x(zi+2δ)
3(zi−x+3δ) if zi ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ] .
Bidder i’s ex–ante expected payoff is obtained by integrating over zi. This yields
E
(
ΠSPRIVi
)
=
∫ x+δ
x−δ
ΠSPRIVi (zi) fZi(zi)dzi
=
δ (3x− 3x+ δ (13− 12 ln (2))) + 3δ2 exp
(
2δ+x−x
δ
)
(ln (16)− 3)
9 (x− x) .
For the parameter’s employed in our design, E
(
ΠSPRIVi
)
= 2.50019. Since the ex–ante
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expected revenue in an auction is the expected value of the good, minus the ex–ante expected
payoffs of the bidders, the ex–ante expected revenue of a SPRIV auction, E
(
RSPRIV
)
, is
E
(
RSPRIV
)
=
(
x+ x
2
)
−
2δ (3x− 3x+ δ (13− 12 ln (2))) + 6δ2 exp
(
2δ+x−x
δ
)
(ln (16)− 3)
9 (x− x) .
For the parameters in our design, this is E
(
RSPRIV
)
= 119.99962.
We also derive the break–even bidding strategy. If all bidders bid according to a monoton-
ically increasing bid function, the bidder with the highest signal wins the auction. Therefore,
if bidders are bidding according to a monotonically increasing bid function, bidders guarantee
themselves negative profits if they bid more that the expected value of the good conditional
on having the highest signal. Thus, the break–even bidding strategy for a SPRIV auction is
given by:
E (X | Zi = zi > Zj) =

1
3
(zi + 2x+ δ) if zi ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ)
zi − δ3 if zi ∈ [x+ δ, x− δ)
(zi+5δ)(zi−δ)+x(zi+5δ)−2x2
3(zi−x+3δ) if zi ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ] .
A.3 Asymmetric information structure (ASYM)
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) provide the unique equilibrium of this game. We denote
the informed bidder as bidder I. In this equilibrium, when the informed bidder observes zI
she bids according to the function
β (zI) = E (E (X | ZI) | ZI ≤ zI)
=
1
FZI (zI)
∫ zI
x−δ
E (X | ZI = s) fZI (s) ds.
For the distribution functions used in our experimental design the equilibrium bid function
for the informed bidder in an ASYM auction is
β (zI) =

2x+zI+δ
3
if zI ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ)
zI+x
2
+ δ
2
6(zI−x) if zI ∈ [x+ δ, x− δ)
2x3+(zI−δ)3+6x2δ−3x2(zI+δ)
3(x2+(zI−δ)2+4xδ−2x(zI+δ))
if zI ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ] .
In equilibrium, the uninformed bidder will mix on the interval [x,E (X)] according to
27
the following distribution function:
Q (b) = Prob [β (ZI) ≤ b]
= FZI
(
β−1 (b)
)
.
So, the uninformed bidder will mix accordingly using this distribution function:
Q (b) =

(β−1(b)−x+δ)2
4δ(x−x) if b ∈ [β (x− δ) , β (x+ δ))
β−1(b)−x
(x−x) if b ∈ [β (x+ δ) , β (x− δ))
4δ(x−x−δ)+(x+3δ−β−1(b))(β−1(b)−x+δ)
4δ(x−x) if b ∈ [β (x− δ) , β (x+ δ)] .
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) show that, in equilibrium, the uninformed bidder
obtains an expected payoff of zero for any bid in the support of Q (b). Let q (zI) := E (X | zI).
Since q (zI) is monotonically increasing in zI , the distribution function of this random variable
is just FZI (q
−1 (·)), where q−1 (·) is the inverse of q (·). Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983)
also demonstrate that when the informed bidder observes zI her expected payoff is
ΠASYMI (zI) =
∫ q(zI)
x
FZI
(
q−1 (s)
)
ds.
That is, the expected payoff of an informed bidder is
ΠASYMI (zI) =

(zI−x+δ)3
24δ(x−x) if zI ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ)
3(x−zI)2−δ2
6(x−x) if zI ∈ [x+ δ, x− δ)
(x−zI+δ)3
24δ(x−x) +
(x+zI−δ)
2
− (x+x)
2
if zI ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ] .
The ex–ante expected payoff of the informed bidder can be found by integrating over zI .
This yields
E
(
ΠASYMI
)
=
∫ x+δ
x−δ
ΠASYMI (zI) fZI (zI) dzI
=
5 (x− x)3 − 10δ2 (x− x) + 8δ3
30 (x− x)2 .
For the parameters employed in our design, E
(
ΠASYMI
)
= 33.2301. The ex–ante expected
revenue for the seller is found by subtracting the ex–ante expected payoff of the informed
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bidder from the expected value of X. This yields
E
(
RASYM
)
=
x+ x
2
−
(
5 (x− x)3 − 10δ2 (x− x) + 8δ3
30 (x− x)2
)
.
For the parameter values used in our design E
(
RASYM
)
= 91.7699.
Since the uninformed bidder has an expected payoff of zero for any bid b ∈ [x,E (X)],
E (X) is the break–even bidding threshold for uninformed ASYM bidders. Bidding above
E (X) ensures negative expected profit upon winning, while bidding below E (X) yields an
expected payoff of zero conditional on winning the auction.
The expected value of the good conditional on zI is the same as the expected value of the
good conditional on zI and having won the auction. Winning the auction does not provide
the informed bidder additional information regarding x. Therefore, the break–even bidding
threshold for an informed ASYM bidder is to bid:
E (X | ZI = zI) =

zI+δ+x
2
if zI ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ)
zI if zI ∈ [x+ δ, x− δ)
zI−δ+x
2
if zI ∈ [x− δ, x+ δ] .
B Instructions for ASYM sessions
Introduction
Welcome. This experiment is about decision making in markets. The following instruc-
tions describe the markets you will be in and the rules that you will face. The decisions you
make during this experiment will determine how much money you earn. If you make good
decisions, you can earn a substantial amount of money. You will be paid in cash privately
at the end of our experiment.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and
you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will go over these instructions with you. After we have read the instructions, there
will be time to ask clarifying questions. When we are done going through the instructions,
each of you will have to answer a few brief questions to ensure everyone understands.
Overview
Our experiment will consist of 30 rounds. In each of these rounds, you will be randomly
paired with another participant in today’s experiment. Both of you will be buyers in a
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market. In each market, there will be a single unit of an indivisible good for sale. As a
buyer, your task is to submit a bid for the purchase of the good. You will receive earnings
based on the outcome of the market. This process will be repeated until all 30 rounds have
been completed.
Determination of Your Earnings
Each participant will receive a show-up fee of $5. In addition, each participant in this
experiment will start with a balance of $3, 200 “experimental dollars” (EDs). EDs will be
traded in for cash at the end of the experiment at a rate of $160ED = $1. Your starting
balance can increase or decrease depending on your payoffs in each round. That is, if you
have a negative payoff in a round, this loss will be deducted from your balance. If you earn
a positive payoff, this is added to your balance. You are permitted to bid more than your
remaining balance. However, if after a round is completed your balance is less than or equal
to zero, you will not be able to participate in any future rounds.
In each round, you and the other buyer in the market will submit a bid. The higher bid
will have to be paid, and the buyer with the higher bid will receive the good. The buyer
who submits the lower bid does not get the good, but does not pay his/her bid. That is, for
each market, the buyer who submits the higher bid will receive:
(Value of the good) − (Own bid)
The person who submits the lower bid will receive:
0
If both buyers bid the same amount, then the winner is determined randomly, with both
buyers having equal probability of receiving the good. You can think of this as a flip of a
fair coin, which determines the winner in the event of a tie. Only the bidder who receives
the good must pay his/her bid.
Notice that the buyer who submits the highest bid can end up with a negative payoff,
if he/she bids more than the good is worth. No buyer is permitted to submit a bid that is
lower than zero.
In each round, the value of the good, which we will denote as v∗, will not be known to
the buyers. The value of this good will be between $25ED and $225ED. Any value between
$25ED and $225ED is equally likely to be chosen as v∗. The value of the good in any given
round is independent of the value in any other round. That is, the value of the good in one
round will not have any effect on the value of the good in a different round.
Private Information
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In each market, one of the two buyers will be randomly chosen to receive some private
information about the value of the good (you can think of this as flipping a coin to determine
which of the buyers will receive this information, where the probability of the coin landing on
each side is 50%). The person who receives the private information will be given an estimate
of the value of the good. The estimate will be a randomly chosen number that is within
$8ED above or below the real value of v∗ (see the illustration below). Any number between
v∗−$8ED, and v∗+$8ED is equally likely to be chosen as the estimate. For example, if you
receive an estimate of $125ED, then you know that v∗ is between $117ED and $133ED,
inclusive. It is possible for the estimate to be a value below $25ED or above $225ED, but
the real value of v∗ will always be between $25ED and $225ED.
Rounds
As mentioned before, there will be 30 rounds in this experiment. In each round there
will be several markets going on simultaneously, with two buyers in each market. After each
round you will be randomly paired with another participant in today’s experiment. This
random assignment is done every round so that two buyers will probably not be in the same
market together for two consecutive rounds. Further, this pairing is anonymous. That is, if
you are a buyer in a given market, you do not know which of the other participants in the
experiment is the other buyer in that market. Remember that these different markets and
rounds are independent from all others, and from one another. The bids and the value of
the good and the estimate in one market or round do not have any effect on other markets
or rounds. Markets and rounds operate independently.
Summary
1. Each participant has a starting balance of $3, 200ED.
2. In every round, each participant will be a buyer in one market. Two participants are
randomly assigned to a market in each round.
3. The value of the good, v∗, is unknown. It is known that it is somewhere between
$25ED and $225ED. Every value between $25ED and $225ED is equally likely to be
v∗.
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4. One buyer in a market is randomly chosen to receive an estimate of v∗. A buyer’s
estimate is not observed by the other buyer in the market. These estimates are ran-
domly and independently drawn from the interval between v∗−$8ED and v∗+ $8ED,
inclusive. Any number from this interval is equally likely to be chosen as the estimate.
5. In each market the high bidder gets v∗ − (Own bid), and the low bidder gets 0. This
payoff is added to the balance of each bidder (a bidder’s balance will go down if the
value is negative, up if this value is positive, and remain unchanged if this value is
zero).
6. Every participant will receive the show-up fee of $5. Additionally, each participant will
receive his/her balance at the end of all 30 rounds, based on the $3, 200ED beginning
balance and earnings in each market.
7. If a participant’s balance should become negative at any point during this experiment,
he/she will not be permitted to participate in future rounds.
If you have any questions, raise your hand and one of us will come help you. Please do
not ask any questions out loud.
Questions
Before we begin the experiment, we would like you to answer a few questions that are
meant to review the rules of today’s experiment. Please raise your hand once you are done,
and an experimenter will attend to you.
1. How many buyers are in each market?
2. Who pays their bid in each market, the high bidder, the low bidder, or both?
3. Each estimate must be within what range of v∗?
4. Are you allowed to bid more than your current balance?
5. For each market, how many buyers get to see an estimate of v∗?
6. If the highest bid in a market is $152.10ED, and the value of the good is revealed to
be $200.90ED, what is the winner’s payoff for that market?
7. What would the earnings from question six have been if the value of the good had been
$25.90ED?
8. If Buyer 1 bids $150.00ED, and Buyer 2 bids $200.00ED, and the value of the
good is revealed to be $220.75ED, what are the payoffs for Buyer 1 and Buyer 2?
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C SPUB equilibrium with risk and loss averse bidders
Consider an SPUB auction with n ≥ 2 bidders. Assume that all bidders have the same
utility function u (x) which is strictly increasing in x, strictly concave for x ≥ 0 and strictly
convex for x < 0. Assume that u (0) = 0.
If a symmetric equilibrium exists in pure strategies, it must be the case that the equilib-
rium expected utility of winning the auction is 0, and the expected utility of increasing the
bid above the equilibrium must be negative. If this were not the case, then any bidder could
increase her bid by an infinitesimal amount, while increasing her payoff by a non-infinitesimal
amount. That is, any bidder could break the resulting tie with an arbitrarily small increase
in her bid, and win the good with certainty (resulting in positive expected utility). In a
symmetric equilibrium no bidder would have an incentive to bid less, because their payoff
would remain 0.
To establish the existence of such an equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that∫ 225
25
u (v − b) f (v) dv = 0
for some b ≥ 0, and that this expression is strictly monotonically decreasing in b. Note that
this expression is continuous, and that the partial derivative with respect to b is negative.
Since
∫ 225
25
u (v − 0) f (v) dv > 0 and ∫ 225
25
u (v − 225) f (v) dv < 0, then the intermediate
value theorem establishes the result. Note that this also establishes the uniqueness of the
symmetric equilibrium.55 Notice that equilibrium does not depend on the number of bidders.
Suppose that the utility function of each of the bidders is given by
u (x) =
xα x ≥ 0−λxβ x < 0.
Note that when α = β and λ = 1, the bid which satisfies
∫ 225
25
(v − b)α ( 1
200
)
dv = 0 is
b = 125 which is thus the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Now consider the case where α = 0.730 and β = 0.733 as well as the loss aversion
parameter λ = 1.381. These parameter values are taken from the conditional model of
Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009), without individual covariates. For simplicity, we assume
that there is no nonlinear probability weighting. The unique symmetric equilibrium is then
given by b = 115.6972.
55When n > 2 there are also asymmetric eqilibria in which at least two of the bidders choose to bid at
the symmetric equilibrium bid, and each of the remaining bidders bid anything less than this bid (or mix on
some interval weakly less than this bid). For simplicity, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria.
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Now consider the case in which all bidders employ the same nonlinear probability weight-
ing function. If we assume the functional form for this nonlinear probability weighing func-
tion is as suggested in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) then the weight (which gives the
transformed distribution function) is given by
w (v) =
F (v)γ
(F (v)γ + (1− F (v))γ) 1γ
.
Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009) estimate that γ = 0.942. The unique symmetric equilibrium
using these parameters is given by b = 115.5073.56
D SPUB auctions and level–k reasoning
Following Crawford and Iriberri (2007), we assume a logit error structure. Denoting bidder
i’s level k belief about her expected profit when there are n bidders in the auction and she
bids bit in period t as
∏nk
it (bit), the probability of observing bid bit when the bidder is level
k (assuming bidder i is not level zero) is assumed to be
Prnk (bit, λnk) =
exp
(
λnk
∏nk
it (bit)
)
∑225
x=0 exp
(
λnk
∏nk
it (x)
) .
λnk is the logit precision parameter for bidders of level k when there are n bidders in the
auction, which determines how likely a bidder is to choose a bid that is not a best response. If
λnk = 0, then the bidder is uniformly randomizing over the set of possible bids. As λnk →∞
the probability that the bidder best responds approaches one. We assume that errors in
choosing bids are independent across periods and individuals. Additionally, we assume that
a bidder’s level does not change over time. For subject i who is level k we observe a sequence
of bids bi = (bi1, bi2, ..., bi30). If, when there are n bidders in the auction, bidder i is level k,
then the likelihood of observing bi is given by
Lnk(bi) =
30∏
t=1
Prnk (bit, λnk) .
56We also calculate the equilibrium with various other parameter estimates for α, β, λ and γ from the
literature. In no case do these estimates rationalize our SPUB data.
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Again following Crawford and Iriberri (2007), we assume that bidders are either level zero,
level one or level two.57 Denote the proportion of level k bidders when there are n bidders
in the auction as pink. Then, the likelihood of observing bi, without conditioning on the level
of bidder i, is given by
pin0
30∏
t=1
(
1
20001
)
+ pin1
30∏
t=1
Prn1 (bit, λn1) + pin2
30∏
t=1
Prn2 (bit, λn2) .
When n = 2 there are a total of 80 subjects. When n = 4 there are a total of 60 subjects,
and when n = 6 there are a total of 90 subjects. Thus, the log-likelihood of observing our
sample is given by
LL =
80∑
i=1
ln
(
pi20
30∏
t=1
(
1
20001
)
+ pi21
30∏
t=1
Pr21 (bit, λ21) + pi22
30∏
t=1
Pr22 (bit, λ22)
)
+
60∑
i=1
ln
(
pi40
30∏
t=1
(
1
20001
)
+ pi41
30∏
t=1
Pr41 (bit, λ41) + pi42
30∏
t=1
Pr42 (bit, λ42)
)
+
90∑
i=1
ln
(
pi60
30∏
t=1
(
1
20001
)
+ pi61
30∏
t=1
Pr61 (bit, λ61) + pi62
30∏
t=1
Pr62 (bit, λ62)
)
.
We estimate two models. In one of these pin0 is assumed to be 0 for n ∈ {2, 4, 6}, while
in the other there is no such restriction. A model with this restriction is of interest for two
reasons. First, it is unlikely that there are any subjects whose behavior is truly random.
Second, random bidding behavior is already implicitly included in the model via the precision
parameters λnk. The estimates for both of these models are reported in Table 8.
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Table 1: Bids relative to the Nash equilibrium
Observed bids Nash bids Percent observed bids are over Nash
ASYM-Informed 77.94 69.54 10%
(41.84) (27.65) (0.35)
ASYM-Uninformeda 57.81 75.23 −23%
(30.99) (28.64) (0.42)
SPUB 72.57 125 −42%
(23.62) (0.00) (0.11)
SPRIV 108.34 105.93 3%
(55.99) (55.03) (0.11)
Note: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses. The unit of observation for this
table is the individual bid. The number of observations is 1500 for SPUB and SPRIV bids. There are
only 750 observations of both informed and uninformed ASYM bids. Nash bids are calculated using the
realized signals when applicable.
aUninformed ASYM bidders are predicted to play a mixed strategy. We report the expected value and
standard deviation of this strategy in the second column, and compare observed bids to the expected value
of this strategy in the last column.
Table 2: Frequency of bids above break–even threshold
All bidders Winning bidders
ASYM-Informed 6% 6.9%
(45/750) (34/491)
ASYM-Uninformed 3.3% 9.7%
(28/750) (25/259)
SPUB 1.6% 3.2%
(24/1500) (24/750)
SPRIV 30.9% 45.3%
(464/1500) (340/750)
Note: Table contains the percentage of bids in excess of the
break–even bidding threshold. The numbers in parentheses re-
flect the observed number of such bids. The unit of observation
for this table is the individual bid. The number of observations
is 1500 for SPUB and SPRIV bids. There are only 750 obser-
vations for both informed and uninformed ASYM bids. When
attention is restricted to winning bidders, there are 491 win-
ning bids by informed ASYM bidders, and 259 winning bids by
uninformed ASYM bidders.
Table 3: Tobit estimates of bid functions
Informed ASYM
bidders
Uninformed ASYM
bidders
SPUB
bidders
SPRIV
bidders
Joint
zit 0.568
∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.014 0.989∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.018) (0.021) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
ln (1 + t) −12.072∗∗∗ −5.113∗∗∗ 4.400∗∗∗ −0.084 4.400∗∗∗
(1.420) (1.627) (0.846) (0.356) (0.793)
Mi −5.260∗∗∗ −3.317 −0.734 −2.137∗∗∗ −0.734
(1.915) (2.384) (1.211) (0.474) (1.135)
m (zit) −0.199
(0.208)
g (zit) 0.093
(0.089)
SPRIVit −65.359∗∗∗
(3.543)
AINFit −14.645∗∗∗
(4.368)
AUNFit 12.477
∗∗∗
(4.346)
SPRIVit · zit 1.000∗∗∗
(0.015)
AINFit · zit 0.582∗∗∗
(0.018)
AUNFit · zit −0.008
(0.018)
SPRIVit · ln (1 + t) −4.491∗∗∗
(1.127)
AINFit · ln (1 + t) −16.470∗∗∗
(1.375)
AUNFit · ln (1 + t) −9.644∗∗∗
(1.376)
SPRIVit ·Mi −1.411
(1.613)
AINFit ·Mi −4.560∗∗
(2.004)
AUNFit ·Mi −2.318
(2.001)
AINFit ·m (zit) −0.209
(0.177)
SPRIVit · g (zit) 0.101
(0.211)
Constant 48.496∗∗∗ 75.194∗∗∗ 63.100∗∗∗ −2.254∗∗ 63.100∗∗∗
(4.448) (5.160) (2.652) (1.105) (2.485)
Note: The unit of observation for this table is the individual bid. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The number of observations is 1500 for SPUB and SPRIV bids. There are only 750 observations of both
informed and uninformed ASYM bids. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4: Summary statistics for payoffs
Observed payoffs Predicted payoffs
ASYM-Informed 28.37 27.29
(37.39) (27.7)
ASYM-Uninformed −1.81 0
(23.63) (0)
SPUB 15.74 0
(45.71) (0)
SPRIV 1.59 2.43
(5.66) (0.69)
Note: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses.
The unit of observation for this table is the individual bid. The number
of observations is 1500 for SPUB and SPRIV bids. There are only 750
observations for both informed and uninformed ASYM bids. Predicted
payoffs are calculated using the realizations of signals when applicable.
Table 5: Summary statistics for revenue
Observed revenue Predicted revenue
ASYM 88.96 88.80a
(37.33) (13.85)
SPUB 84.06 125
(21.87) (0)
SPRIV 112.36 107.92
(55.94) (55.17)
Note: Table contains means with standard deviations in
parentheses. The unit of observation for this table is the
individual auction. The number of observations is 750.
Predicted revenue is calculated using the realizations of
signals when applicable.
aPredicted revenue of an ASYM auction is
E (max (β (zI) , bu)), where bu is the bid of the un-
informed bidder.
Table 6: Summary statistics for bidding and the payoffs of winning bidders in SPUB auctions
with two, four or six bidders.
Observed bid Predicted bid Observed payoff of
winning bidders
Predicted payoff of
winning bidders
Two bidders 75.36 125 35.52 0
(32.47) (0) (66.54) (0)
Four bidders 91.33 125 7.12 0
(31.88) (0) (64.42) (0)
Six bidders 108.2 125 −22.83 0
(39.06) (0) (63.25) (0)
Note: Table contains means with standard deviations in parentheses. The unit of observation for this table
is the individual bid. When all (only winning) bids are considered there are 2700 (450) observations for
auctions with six bidders, 1800 (450) observations for auctions with four bidders, and 900 (450) observations
for auctions with two bidders. The data presented is from the sessions run at Centro Vernon Smith de
Economı´a Experimental.
Table 7: Frequency of bids above the break–
even bidding threshold in SPUB auctions with
two, four or six bidders.
All bidders Winning bidders
Two bidders 5% 10%
(45/900) (45/450)
Four bidders 12% 40%
(215/1800) (178/450)
Six bidders 36% 89%
(987/2700) (401/450)
Note: Table contains the percentage of bids in excess
of the break–even bidding threshold. The numbers in
parentheses reflect the observed number of such bids.
The unit of observation for this table is the individual
bid. When all (only winning) bids are considered there
are 2700 (450) observations for auctions with six bidders,
1800 (450) observations for auctions with four bidders,
and 900 (450) observations for auctions with two bid-
ders. The data presented is from the sessions run at
Centro Vernon Smith de Economı´a Experimental.
Table 8: Estimates of models of level–k reasoning in
SPUB auctions
Without Level 0 With Level 0
pink λˆnk pink λˆnk
n = 2
Level 0 − − 0.09 −
(n.a.)
Level 1 0.93 0.12*** 0.91 0.12
(2099.22) (0.00) (n.a.) (n.a.)
Level 2 0.07 0.31* 0.00 14.41
(159.58) (0.12) (n.a.) (n.a.)
n=4
Level 0 − − 0.05 −
(n.a.)
Level 1 0.99 0.28*** 0.95 0.32
(3710.27) (0.01) (n.a.) (n.a.)
Level 2 0.01 1.35 0.00 3.41
(40.11) (1.15) (n.a.) (n.a.)
n=6
Level 0 − − 0.32 −
(n.a.)
Level 1 0.98 0.07*** 0.68 0.52
(3042.58) (0.00) (n.a.) (n.a.)
Level 2 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.50
(56.56) (0.24) (n.a.) (n.a.)
Observations 6900 6900
Log-likelihood -2206.11 -399.03
Note: Table contains parameter estimates with standard errors in
parentheses, when available.
When estimating the model with level 0 bidders, the Hessian was
non-invertible and the standard errors are not available, which we
denote by n.a.
The unit of observation for this table is the individual bid.
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Equilibrium bid functions and observed bids for informed ASYM bidders.
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Figure 2: Boxplots of bidding relative to Nash predictions by period for informed ASYM
bidders.
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(b) First 10 periods and last 10 periods respectively
Figure 3: Cumulative distributions of bids for informed (grey) and uninformed (solid black)
ASYM bidders, as well as the equilibrium distribution (dashed).
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Figure 4: Observed bids (left panel) and payoffs (right panel) of informed ASYM bidders
relative to the bids and payoffs of these bidders if they were best responding to the empirical
distribution of the uninformed ASYM bidders.
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Figure 5: Boxplots of bidding relative to Nash predictions by period for SPUB bidders.
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Figure 6: Boxplots of uninformed bids in ASYM (left panel) and SPUB (right panel) auc-
tions. Each box summarizes the bids of an individual bidder, and the bidders are sorted by
average bid, from smallest to largest.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium bid functions and observed bids for SPRIV bidders.
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Figure 8: Boxplots of bidding relative to Nash predictions by period for SPRIV bidders.
Four outliers are excluded.
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Figure 9: Frequency of bids above the break–even threshold by period for informed bidders
(solid) and uninformed bidders (dashed). The left panel contains data when the information
structure is asymmetric, and the right panel contains data when the information structure
is symmetric.
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Figure 10: Average bids across periods in SPUB auctions with two bidders (solid black), four
bidders (dashed gray) and six bidders (solid gray). The data presented is from the sessions
run at Centro Vernon Smith de Economı´a Experimental.
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Figure 11: Frequency of bids above the break–even threshold by period in SPUB auctions
with two bidders (solid black), four bidders (dashed gray) and six bidders (solid gray). The
data presented is from the sessions run at Centro Vernon Smith de Economı´a Experimental.
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Figure 12: Average payoffs of winning bidders across periods in SPUB auctions with two
bidders (solid black), four bidders (dashed gray) and six bidders (solid gray). The data
presented is from the sessions run at Centro Vernon Smith de Economı´a Experimental.
